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Seward’s True Folly:

American Diplomacy and Strategy during “Our Little War
With the Heathens,” Korea, 1871
Ian Murray
From June 10 to June 12, 1871, American amphibious forces engaged in a
forty-eight hour battle with the Chosŏn dynasty of Korea. Though trivialized
in the New York Herald under the headline of “Our Little War With the
Heathens,”1 the affair inflicted more casualties on Asian peoples than any
other American military action until the Philippine uprising of 1899. A fleet
boasting five Americans warships set sail for Korea on May 16th with eighty
pieces of cannon and 1,230 men aboard, under the command of Rear Admiral
John Rodgers. The expedition pursued a diplomatic mission—the opening of
Korea to international commercial trade—entrusted to United States Minister
to China Frederick Low. However, the expedition secured authorization from
the State Department to impose their aims by force if necessary. On May
31, the Americans reached Ganghwa Island in the estuary of the Han River.
Korean soldiers stationed at fortresses lining the river bend at Sondolmok fired
upon the westerners. Homer Crane Blake, Captain and Commander of the
USS Alaska, describes the outbreak of hostilities in a letter written on June 2.
As we came up abreast, a single shot, apparently from
a musket or pistol, was fired from near the standard, and
instantly, from the fort and masked batteries along the face
of the hill, they opened a heavy fire upon the ships and
boats, which was promptly returned from all the vessels, and
which soon drove them from the guns, they retreating to the
ravines.2
The Americans drew back, demanding an apology from the prefect of
Ganghwa Island. With none forthcoming, the Americans launched a counteroffensive upon the expiration of a ten-day ultimatum. The Americans’
superior firepower generated a large discrepancy in casualties. The United
States razed three Korean fortresses—Ch’oji, Kwangsong and Tokjin—
killing 350 Koreans while suffering only three fatalities of their own. On
June 12th, the Americans departed from Korea, citing the lopsided death
toll as evidence of an overwhelming victory. On July 17th, the New York
Times celebrated the “Speedy and Effective Punishment of the Barbarians.”3
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However, the Korean Government celebrated the American withdrawal as
a great victory and a vindication of their time-honored policy of seclusion.
At face value, the events related above can be interpreted in numerous
ways. For example, Neoconservatives and Liberal internationalists might
herald the initiative as a laudable effort to bring the benefits of international
exchange to a people subjugated by a backward regime. On the other hand,
revisionists and anti-interventionists might view America’s acts as a shameful
example of cruel, imperialistic and self-interested gunboat diplomacy.
However, when placed in the proper context of American diplomacy in the
Far East, the American Invasion of Korea proves virtually indistinguishable
in terms of ideology from such widely heralded American triumphs as the
1844 Treaty of Wanghia and Commodore Perry’s expedition to Japan in
1853. To demonstrate this fact, this paper endeavors to construct a complete
narrative of the American Invasion, furnishing the above events with their
proper setting, story line, and resolution. In doing so, the true nature of
the invasion comes to light: an attempt to carry on established American
traditions sabotaged by woeful tactics and flawed geopolitical assessments.
This study’s survey of 19th century American Diplomacy relies on Tyler
Dennett’s seminal work, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of the United
States with reference to China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century. Much of the
analytical framework of this paper comes from the work of Lawrence H.
Battistini, Walter LaFeber, and the essays compiled in Ernest R. May and
James C. Thomson’s anthology, American-East Asian Relations: A Survey. The
more detailed chronology of American diplomacy regarding the Korean crisis
draws upon American diplomatic documents and correspondence compiled
in the official documentary historical record, Foreign Relations of the United States.
The following works also aided the construction of this historical chronology:
Kim Yongkoo’s The Five Years’ Crisis, 1866-1871, Gordon H. Chang’s
Whose “Barbarism”? Whose “Treachery”? Race and Civilization in the Unknown
United States-Korea War of 1871, and Woong Joe Kang’s The Korean Struggle
for International Identity in the Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866-1882.
American Diplomacy in the Far East
In the nation’s infancy, a number of worrying prospects confronted
American statesmen. First, if America became enmeshed in Europe’s wars
of imperialism, the requisite military mobilization would infringe on the
domestic liberty for which colonial patriots had so vehemently struggled, as
these conflicts could transpire on American soil. Second, forging alliances
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The Empress of China at Mart’s Jetty, Port Pirie, 1876. The first American ship to
open trade with China, the Empress of China set sail from New York for Canton
in 1784.

Penn History Review

45

Seward’s True Folly
with the more potent nations of Europe would require American statesmen
to adopt alien causes. Furthermore, an America open to foreign alliance
would be subject to European courtship, begetting factionalism within the
Union. George Washington, with significant editorial input from Alexander
Hamilton, addressed each of these concerns in his 1796 Farewell Address,
proclaiming that “nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate
antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others
should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward
all should be cultivated.”4 In this way, George Washington enshrined the
American ideal of maintaining unilateral commercial relations with all states,
“regardless of their form of government or the extent of their imperialism.”5
In 1784, America began the process of forging such unilateral commercial
relationships in the Far East. On August 28, the Empress of China, a refitted
privateer from the Revolutionary War docked in Canton, marking the start
of a tradition that would come to be known as the “Old China Trade.” A
close-knit group of New England merchants dominated this trade, motivated
more by their enterprising spirit than by any demand for Chinese goods in
America. Due to the remoteness of the Far East and the small percentage
of the American population concerned with its affairs, the State Department
rarely meddled in Sino-American relations at this early stage. As a result,
historians such as Tyler Dennett assert that American activity in Asia prior
to 1840 was void of political significance. Edward D. Graham, however,
considers such a judgment “arguable.”6 In reality, the Government’s handsoff approach to Far Eastern affairs during the early 19th century contributed
greatly to the development of a diplomatic policy in the Pacific centered
on commercial interests. As Washington initially left early merchants to
their own devices, they inevitably followed their capitalistic self-interest
when making on-the-spot decisions. By the sum of these decisions, New
England merchants forged a tradition of seeking equal trade agreements
and extraterritoriality. This model, Dennett agrees, became the modus
operandi adopted by the State Department in the second half of the century.
America’s relationship with the Far East evolved towards the middle of the
19th century largely as a function of both technological and political phenomena.
The development of the clipper ship and the steamship greatly enhanced the
efficiency of maritime trade. The acquisition of California in 1848 gave the
United States a Pacific port. Finally, the decision of Great Britain that same
year to nullify the last vestiges of the Navigation Acts granted Americans
equal commercial rights within the British Isles. These conditions produced a
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golden age of American maritime activity, with the high point coming in 1855
when American shipping totaled 5,212,000 tons.7 American Exports to China,
which had totaled only about $2 million in the 1840s, rose to nearly $9 million in
the 1860s.8 The increasing significance of Pacific trade spurred the American
Government into action on the Far Eastern front. The Government’s policy,
as presaged by the activities of the New England merchants during the “Old
China Trade,” focused on earning most-favored-nation privileges from East
Asian governments. The State Department also favored the preservation
and territorial integrity of sovereign nations such as China and Japan, partly
from an ideological distaste for colonialism, but mostly to prevent European
spheres of influence from interfering with American economic opportunities.
The realities of East Asian diplomacy, however, obligated Americans to
compromise these principles in day-to-day operations. According to John
K. Fairbank, “The idea of the American diplomatic approach to China as
independent of the British, less imperialistic, more friendly and egalitarian and
yet enterprising and decisive…does not fit with the British diplomatic records.”9
Americans constituted only one small element of large foreign community in
China. In 1836, only nine of the fifty-five foreign firms operating in Canton
were American.10 The foreign community as a whole was in turn subsidiary to
the Chinese ruling class. Britons adapted much more easily to the social ideals
of the ruling class, often causing Americans to embrace Anglo-American
collaboration under British leadership. All in all, Fairbank concludes, “the
American in China was obliged to be a democrat manqué, a ruler with qualms
of conscience, in a world he never made but found seductively enjoyable.”11
Though commonly frustrated by routine activities, the State
Department was nevertheless able to institute American tradition through
the negotiation of grand commercial treaties with major Far Eastern
nations. In 1832, Andrew Jackson sent Edmund Roberts on a voyage to
negotiate commercial agreements with Siam, Hué, and Japan. He achieved
his aim in the first country, failed in the second, and perished en route to
the third. In 1839, Martin Van Buren authorized Captain Charles Wilkes
to explore the Pacific. According to Thomas McCormick, the mission
helped the United States become “the most knowledgeable power in the
world as far as the great Pacific basin was concerned.”12 On December
1842, President John Tyler extended the Monroe Doctrine to the
Hawaiian Islands, publicly denouncing any attempt at their colonization.
British victory in the First Opium War inspired the first truly significant
American diplomatic action in East Asia. Through the 1842 Treaty of
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Nanking, Britain captured Hong Kong and four other Chinese ports, as well
as authority over Chinese tariffs and customs rates. New England merchants,
injured by an economic depression from which America was just beginning to
recover, recognized the need to ensure the continued commercial privileges
in China. They put pressure on Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who in
turn employed Caleb Cushing as the first U.S. minister to China. In a letter
drafted on May 8, 1843, Webster charged Cushing to negotiate a commercial
treaty with Middle Kingdom, securing “the entry of American ships and
cargoes into these ports on terms as favorable as those which are enjoyed by
English merchants.”13 This letter formally inaugurated the American tradition
of insisting upon most-favored-nation treatment. Americans celebrated
their new “special relationship,” being the first anti-imperialist power to
forge an agreement with China. The Treaty of Wanghia, signed in 1844,
fulfilled all of Webster’s objectives, including the guarantee of extraterritorial
rights for American merchants in China. By this time, however, Webster
was no longer at the reins of the State Department. Both he and his
successor Abel P. Upshur had since relinquished the post of Secretary
of State, leaving the position to former Vice President John C. Calhoun
After seven years out of the State Department, five of which he spent in the
Senate, Webster returned to his old position in the Cabinet of Millard Fillmore.
Again, Webster took action in the Far East, this time turning his attention to
the staunchly isolationist regime in Japan. Americans salivated at the promise
of lucrative Japanese trade, which was forbidden by ancient Japanese laws that
Americans found loathsome and unnatural. Webster hoped to end Japan’s
deviant resistance to foreign trade—on American terms of course. This
meant most-favored-nation status. He also he wished to protect shipwrecked
Americans, who had often received brutal welcomes upon washing up on
Japanese shores. Finally, he planned to establish coaling stations in Japan
to facilitate more efficient passage of steamships from California to China.
To this end, Webster (who died before the mission was launched) sent
Commodore Perry to Japan in 1853 with a sizeable fleet of steamships.
Perry carried with him a letter from Millard Fillmore, proposing to
the Emperor of Japan “that the United States and Japan should live in
friendship and have commercial intercourse with each other.”14 As Webster’s
directions to Cushing had a decade earlier, Fillmore’s letter stressed the
mutual benefits of the arrangement, imploring, “If your imperial majesty
were so far to change the ancient laws as to allow a free trade between the
two countries it would be extremely beneficial to both.”1516* Perry sought
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to demonstrate the technological prowess of America, both through
his fleet and through gifts such as a miniature railroad and Japan’s first
telegraph. Japanese cooperation was hesitant but ultimately forthcoming;
Townshend Harris eventually secured the opening of five major ports
and affirmed American extraterritoriality rights in Japan in 1858. For the
time being, however, there was no talk of a “special relationship.” In a
spirit they would later apply to Korea, Americans believed that they were
“civilizing” Japan. In the words of Willie P. Mangum, a Whig Senator
from North Carolina, “You have to deal with barbarians as barbarians.”17
Few Americans have had as decided an impact on their nation’s relations
with East Asia as William H. Seward, who took control of the State
Department in the 1860s. He assumed the role of Secretary of State under
President Abraham Lincoln March 5, 1861. He would retain this position
under Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, the last chapter of a prominent
political life. Born in Orange Country, New York on May 16, 1801, he served
as both Governor and Senator for his home state for a combined 22 years.
He was even considered the frontrunner for the Republican nomination for
President in 1860, prior to being eclipsed by Lincoln. Seward vigorously
advocated the pursuit of American interests in Asia, considering the Pacific
Ocean the “chief theatre of events in the world’s great hereafter.”18 While
still a member of the Senate, he demonstrated this attitude by putting aside
his deep-seated opinion against slavery to support Californian statehood. He
did not envision American activity in the Pacific sphere as military or imperial,
but rather as a mutually beneficial exchange of goods and ideas. He assumed
that this genre of American intervention would be greeted by Far Eastern
nations as a desirable alternative to violent European conquest, asking, “If
they could be roused and invigorated now, would they spare their European
oppressors and spite their American benefactors?”19 His most visible
contribution to the American cause in the Pacific was the purchase of Alaska
from Russia, concluded in 1867, which acquired the moniker “Seward’s Folly.”
Seward insisted on the protection of Americans and their property in China,
but remained cautious to avoid disrespecting Chinese rights. On August 14,
1865, he affirmed that, “the Government of the United States is not disposed
to be technical or exacting in its intercourse with the Chinese Government,
but will deal with it in entire frankness, cordiality, and friendship.”20 With
regard to Japan, however, Seward proved more callous and skeptical. Seward
seemed to operate on the assumption that Japan was incessantly plotting to
shirk its treaty obligations. He believed that American commercial rights in
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Japan were vulnerable, and that the expulsion of foreigners was imminent.
Seward’s mistrust of the Japanese generated an unstable state of affairs when
coupled with his willingness to employ the use of force. According to Tyler
Dennett, “Seward, more than any Secretary of State before or since his day,
was favorably disposed toward a “gun-boat diplomacy.”21 For instance, on
the night of December 5, 1860, Henry Heusken, a Dutch translator in the
service of United States Consul-General to Japan Townshend Harris, was
assassinated by a handful of masked assailants. In response, Seward, who
took office the following March, proposed a joint naval demonstration against
Japan to the foreign offices of France, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia.
Officially, Korea in the 1860s was a part of the Sadae order, a sinocentric
and Confucian international system that governed certain areas of East
Asia. The order prescribed a hierarchical, anti-egalitarian society based
on the ideology of li—individual morality and harmony between the ruler
and the ruled. This principle applied to international relations within the
order. Therefore, Imperial China’s Zongli Yamen, the government entity
charged with foreign affairs, handled the official diplomatic activity of its
obedient vassal states such as Korea. However, according to Tyler Dennett,
China’s chokehold on Korea was not so severe. In fact, China repeatedly
insisted in diplomatic communication with foreign nations that Korea was
administratively independent. They even refused to accept any responsibility
for Korean destruction or injury of foreign life and property. China
essentially pursued a “dog-in-the-manger policy.” They did not want Korea,
but they did not want Korea to come under the shadow of any other power,
nor did they relish the idea of Korean independence.”22 In 1863, the teenage
King Gojong assumed Korea’s throne. Power rested in the hands of his
father and regent Daewongun until the King reached adulthood in 1873.
Daewongun staunchly advocated isolationism, as well as the persecution of
Western missionaries. Koreans considered all Westerners “barbarians,” as
did most East Asian peoples. This category, of course, included Americans
On the eve of engagement with Korea, American diplomacy, imbued with
the goals of securing most-favored-nation status and extraterritorial rights in
East Asia, sat in the hands of Secretary of State William H. Seward, who deeply
mistrusted isolationist regimes and held no reservations about employing
force to ensure their compliance with international free trade. Korea, with
Daewongun as the head of state, also had a resolute diplomatic policy:
staunch isolationism. On top of all this, despite having developed a friendly
commercial relationship with China, America could not rely on the mediating
50 Ian Murray

Seward’s True Folly
influence of the Middle Kingdom. China in the 1860s wished neither to manage
the administration of Korea nor take any responsibility for Korea’s quarrels.
The French Invasion of Korea
America was not the first western nation to attempt to engage Korea
diplomatically in the late 19th century. Indeed, France cast the initial stone
to rouse Korea from its hibernation on the international stage. Like other
contemporaneous European states, 19th century France exploited legal
positivism to codify a diplomacy based on Eurocentricism. Europeans
classified international actors into three categories: civilized states, who were
to be treated as full subjects of the law; semi-civilized states, who were to be
exploited via asymmetrical treaties; and barbarians, who were to be exploited
by invasion and occupation. Korea belonged firmly in the third category.
The European mechanism for establishing relations with this category
of nations was predatory imperialism, a model in which private enterprise
(legitimate or otherwise) and missionary expeditions paved the way for state
participation. Accordingly, the earliest French presence in Korea arrived
in the form of Catholic missionaries. At first, these missionaries profited
from existing Confucian rites to ease the natives’ transition from traditional
“barbarism” to enlightened Catholicism. However, the Vatican suppressed
this opportunistic behavior in 1742, when Pope Benedict XIV issued an
edict outlawing both the veneration of Confucius and the worship of one’s
ancestors. This measure strained relations between Korea and the French
missionaries therein, notably inspiring the state-sanctioned execution of 300
Catholics in 1801. Tensions flared once more in 1866, when the Korean
government deemed Catholicism irreconcilable with the Confucian political
order (the former declaring all men equal before God), and authorized the
repression of Catholic activity on the peninsula. For France, the most salient
consequence of this declaration was the execution of nine French priests
The French response was retaliation. In a letter home to his parents sent
from Ning-Po, China, French quartermaster Eugène Masson defended his
nation’s reprisal with the following simple explanation: “It was necessary to
find these Korean gentlemen to teach them that they don’t have the right to
treat our compatriots in such a manner.”23 However, pure vengeance was
not the sole motive for French action. At least one implicated Frenchman,
Minister to China Henri de Bellonet, perceived the Korean calamity as a
grand opportunity. He revealed his ulterior geopolitical motives in a letter to
E.D. Lhuys, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs:
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Rear Admiral John Rodgers confers with other officers on board the USS
Colorado during the American expedition, June 1871
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I am not going to make a long explanation about the
advantages of making Chosun a colony or simply put in the
position of being under the protection of our Emperor. It
is enough just to glance at the map to see that it is useful
to send troops to this country, in case of the complications
which might arise between China and Japan in the
future.”24
Without requesting the proper authorization, Bellonet sent a
highly inflammatory dispatch to the Zongli Yamen on July 13,
1866. Its contents amount to a declaration of war against Korea on
behalf of the Emperor, egregiously over-reaching his jurisdiction.
In a few days our military forces are to march to the conquest
of Chosun, and the Emperor, my august sovereign, alone,
has now the right and power to dispose, according to his
good pleasure, of the country and of the vacant throne.25
Bellonet’s actions enraged Rear Admiral Pierre Gustave Roze,
Commander of the French Far East Squadron. Roze expressed his fury to
Justin, comte de Chasseloup-Laubat, the Minister of the Navy, complaining
that China would certainly forward Bellonet’s bluster to the Koreans, giving
them ample time to prepare their defenses. Indeed, China did warn Korea of
the planned French aggression on August 16. Furthermore, Roze protested
that Bellonet had stepped on his toes. Since France had not established
diplomatic relations with Korea, the military should have primary jurisdiction
in Korean affairs. Chasseloup-Laubat feared conflict, insecure about France’s
incomplete knowledge of Korean coastal geography. Roze, however, had
already sailed his fleet, carrying about 1,000 men, into Korean waters.
In his aforementioned letter to his parents, quartermaster Eugène Masson
again displays his penchant for poetic simplicity when discussing the nature
of the Roze expedition. He sums up the experience in the following manner:
“During our journey, we passed ourselves off as children of the moon, but a
short distance from the capital the Koreans probably found that the children
of the moon penetrated too far into their interior.”26 The French occupied
Kapgot fortress on Kanghwa Island on October 14, proceeding to occupy
the office of the Island’s magistrate on the 16th. On October 26, three French
soldiers perished in a skirmish at Munsu Mountain fortress. November 10
saw the most dramatic action of the expedition. Yang Honsu led a corps
of professional hunters in an ambush of the French garrison at Chondung
Temple, slaying thirty-two French soldiers while suffering only one casualty.
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In his study of the Five Years’ Crisis, Kim Yongkoo notes that this battle
represented “One of the few instances in the colonialist history of Europe
in which European soldiers were defeated in non-European territory.”27
The victory sufficed to encourage a withdrawal of the French presence.
Roze intended the retreat to be temporary, as suggested by Masson’s letter:
We left Korea to spend the winter in China because we did
not have a large enough force to occupy the entire power, it
is probable that if the King is not overthrown by next spring,
we shall return with superior force sent to us from France.28
The French never returned to Korea. The failure of Roze’s expedition
greatly embarrassed France in the eyes of international public opinion. The
French government directed its anger at Roze and Bellonet, both having
engaged in decisive action in the absence of any clear instructions from
Paris. On November 11, 1866, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Lionel,
Marquis de Moustier reproached Bellonet, writing, “I am very seriously
shocked by your belief that you could carry out any actions which suited
your own personal agenda though no such authority had been granted you.”29
Two outcomes of the French failure in Korea would have a significant
impact on American diplomacy in the Far East. First, Korean morale
soared in the wake of the departed would-be colonists. Stone tablets were
erected, furnished with the inscription, “Not to fight back when invaded
by Western barbarians is to invite further attacks. Selling the country out
in peace negotiations is the greatest danger to guard against.”30 A dispatch
was sent to high-ranking officials in the Government that would seem to
pose an ominous threat to America’s ultimate designs in Korea: “If we
are unable to endure our strife and have to make a treaty with foreigners,
it would be an act of betrayal to our country.”31 Second, Admiral Roze
brought back from Korea intelligence that the Koreans had burned an
American vessel, the General Sherman, apparently slaughtering its entire crew.
The General Sherman and Korean-American Tension
As was the case for the French, individual action preceded calculated
American intervention, in this case piracy. On September 5, 1866, the U.S.
merchant ship General Sherman was set ablaze by Korean artillery under the
orders of Pak Kyusu, Governor of P’yongan Province. It is vital to note that
the American government did not ascertain the full details of the incident for
approximately two decades, although the correct chronology is maintained
below. The General Sherman was owned by an American, W.B. Preston, but had
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been hired by a British firm, Messrs. Meadows and Company, to transport
commercial freight and arms. The ship set sail from Chefoo, China en route
to Korea for the purported purpose of conducting trade. In reality, the
motives behind the expedition were far more dastardly, involving the looting
of royal tombs in the vicinity of P’yongyang. The General Sherman’s Captain
Page was American, while the Manager of commodities, George Hogarth,
and the translator, Robert Jermain Thomas, were both British. On August
27th, the expedition kidnapped Pak’s Military Aide, Yi Hyonik. Four days later,
cannon fire from the General Sherman felled 12 Korean soldiers and civilians.
The sum of these offensive actions roused Pak to retaliation, bringing a fiery
end to what the United States assumed to be a legitimate trading mission.
Upon returning to China from Korea in October of 1866, Admiral Roze
relayed his limited intelligence of the destruction of the General Sherman
incident to E.T. Sanford, the American consul in Chefoo. Sanford dutifully
notified Anson Burlingame, the American Minister to China. Burlingame
passed along the information to three recipients. The first was Prince Kung
of China, who insisted that the relationship between China and Korea was
purely ceremonial, disavowing Chinese responsibility for Korean diplomatic
conduct. The second was Admiral Henry H. Bell, Commander of the
Asiatic Squadron of the United States’ Navy. The third was Secretary of
State William H. Seward, to whom Burlingame wrote on December 15, 1866.
The Navy responded first, by virtue of the fact that Burlingame’s letter
did not have to travel as far to reach Bell as it did to reach Seward. Admiral
Bell sent Robert W. Shufeldt with the USS Wachusetts to investigate the fate
of the General Sherman. Shufeldt carried with him a letter to the King, and
met with an official from the city of Haeju on January 29, 1867. The official
behaved arrogantly, but insisted that he had no information concerning
the incident, even after Shufeldt threatened violent retaliation. Shufeldt
departed from Korea without gaining any useful information, though he
did develop a suspicion that the crew of the General Sherman may have been
responsible for its own demise. During his journey, Shufeldt took the liberty
of examining Port Hamilton, a small group of islands off the southern
coast of Korea. He supposed that these islands could be strategically useful,
comparing them to Gibraltar. He suggested that the United States could
seize the islands and “operate upon the Southern coast of Corea until that
government is forced to acknowledge at least its responsibility to foreigners.”32
Needless to say, the mysterious destruction of an American merchant
ship deeply troubled the State Department. Upon receiving Burlingame’s
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dispatch, William Seward immediately drew up plans for a proposed
joint invasion of the peninsula in cooperation with France, who he
assumed would be itching for retribution after the defeat of Admiral
Roze.
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, however, espoused
cautious prudence, urging the State Department to launch a thorough
investigation of the incident rather than engage in rash retaliation.
Burlingame likewise sought to temper the Secretary of State’s aggression
when he initially notified Seward of the General Sherman incident, writing:
If my advice can have weight, it will be that our presence
there should rather restrain than promote aggression, and
serve to limit the action to such satisfaction only as great
and civilized nations should, under the circumstances, have
from the ignorant and weak.33
Nevertheless, Seward plowed forward, proposing his strategy to J.F.G.
Berthémy, the French Minister to the United States, on March 2, 1867.
Berthémy favored the proposal, citing its potential to repair Franco-American
relations, cancel out the failure of the previous year’s expedition, open Korea
to foreign trade and investment, and stymie Russian expansionist designs in the
Far East. Such an alliance would have wedded the efforts of two nations with
radically different priorities in the region. According to Boleslaw Szczesniak,
For France the expedition to Korea was a kind of
imperialistic punishment for the loss of French property
and life—especially since France even considered the
annexation of Korea—while for America it was a method
of cooperative participation in opening the “hermit nation”
for peaceful reasons.”34
Berthémy’s government, however, declined the proposal, for reasons which
cannot be comprehended without some knowledge of contemporaneous
French geopolitics.
In January of 1862, France, along with Spain and Britain, had sent a fleet
to Mexico in an effort to compel President Benito Juarez to resume interest
payment on national debts. The Spanish and British soon realized that
Napoleon III’s true aim was to conquer Mexico, and chose to withdraw their
forces in April. France suffered an initial setback at the Battle of Puebla
on May 5, but rallied with a string of victories culminating in the capture
of Mexico City on June 7, 1863. On April 10, 1864, Archduke Maximilian
Ferdinand of the Royal House of Austria signed the Treaty of Miramar,
accepting his appointment to the Mexican throne. This deed incurred the
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wrath of the United States, whose Congress unanimously passed a resolution
opposing a Mexican monarchy. The following spring, the tide began to turn
against the French. On April 11, the army of the Mexican Republic won
battles at Tacambaro and Michoacan. As the American Civil War drew to a
close, the United States sent 50,000 troops to the Mexican border to threaten
the French and furnish the Republican army with supplies. In February of
1866, the United States blockaded French shipments of reinforcements and
demanded a French withdrawal, to which Napoleon III complied on May 31.
On June 19, 1867, the Republican forces executed Maximilian I and restored
Benito Juarez to the Mexican presidency.
In the throes of the Mexican calamity, France’s Second Empire could
not afford to suffer any additional humiliations in the international theater.
Accordingly, when Admiral Roze withdrew from Korea in November of 1866,
the French government profited from the remoteness of the conflict to simply
claim victory. After initially admonishing Roze and Bellonet in diplomatic
correspondence, the French Government ultimately rewarded each man’s
initiative with promotion. Bellonet bade adieu to the Pacific and settled into a
more comfortable position as Minister to Sweden. Roze inherited the role of
Acting Viceroy of Indochina, later ascending to a highly influential position
as Commander of the Mediterranean Fleet. This stunning act of revisionism
on the part of the French spared the Emperor the bother of further activity
in Korea. Claiming that French objectives had been thoroughly satisfied, the
French declined to take part in Seward’s joint invasion.
The French refusal ushered in a year of cautious inaction. The stalemate
was broken in March 1868 when Yu Wentai, a Chinese national who had
abandoned the voyage of the General Sherman, informed a U.S. consul in
China that four crewmembers of the General Sherman remained alive in
Korea. Furthermore, Yu believed that two of the survivors were Chinese
nationals. Yu claimed to have received this information from a Korean
named Kim Chap’yong. Samuel Wells Williams, acting as Minister to China
while Burlingame turned his attention to the negotiations of the Burlingame
Treaty, sent a letter to Prince Kung on March 3, imploring China to assist
America’s investigations. On March 9, the Prince upheld China’s laissez faire
policy toward Korean affairs, replying: “Although Chosun is in one sense a
dependency of China, her authorities are now engaged in eradicating western
religion and forbidding its exercise, and their proceedings in this matter are
carried on by themselves just as they please.”35 China did, however, issue a
request that Korea return any surviving crewmembers.
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Forced to act without Chinese assistance, the Navy dispatched Captain
John C. Febiger and the USS Shenandoah to Korea, in search of information
and survivors. Febiger first met with Kim Chap’yong, who denied having
provided Yu Wentai with any information. Febiger’s mission, however, was
far more successful than Shufeldt’s. Korea received the captain far more
warmly, and on April 30 the Korean Council of the State ruled that Febiger
was entitled to a letter of explanation from Pak Kyusu, governor of Hwanghae
province. Pak himself was largely responsible for the change in Korea’s
attitude. A respected and forward-thinking scholar, he educated many of the
intellectuals who would later found the reform-minded Enlightenment Party.
Pak supported engaging American in negotiations as early as 1866. According
to Kim Yongkoo, he “transcended Korean experience and glimpsed the true
nature of Western society before Korea became actively involved in it.”36
He believed that the Korean Government had dealt inappropriately with
Shufeldt, and encouraged Koreans to welcome Captain Febiger. In his letter,
Pak praises the moral standards of the United States, but also accurately
depicts the violent nature of the General Sherman excursion and justifies the
Korean response. He expresses the bewilderment of Koreans at American
indignation, explaining that the crew of the General Sherman “came into our
country without permission and caused complications, and now you are
blaming us for that incident and we do not understand your intention in doing
so.”37 When the letter was forwarded to Shufeldt, he praised its construction
and trusted its contents, reporting, “The letter was so statesman-like in its
character and bore such intrinsic evidence of the truth of its statements that
both Captain Febiger and I were convinced that the attack on the General
Sherman was made by an unauthorized mob under strong provocation.”38
Around this time, the State Department again leapt into action, receiving
intelligence from Frederick Jenkins, an interpreter with the U.S. Consul-General
in Shanghai, suggesting that Korea may be willing to negotiate a peaceful
resolution of the predicament. Seward acted swiftly to seize this opportunity,
endowing his nephew George, the U.S. Consul-General in Shanghai, with
plenipotentiary powers and sending him to Korea “to procure a treaty of amity
and commerce as nearly similar in its provisions to those existing between the
United States and Japan as may be found practicable and expedient.”39 In his
official instructions, Seward stressed the peaceful nature of the expedition,
reminding his nephew “to practise discretion, prudence, and patience, while
firmly asserting the dignity and maintaining the demands of the United
States”40 and urging him to reserve force “for ultimate consideration.”41
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Unfortunately, with the expedition barely underway, it became obvious
that Jenkins had swindled the State Department. He was in fact mixed
up in an illicit conspiracy, hatched by corrupt French missionary Father
Stanislas Féron and German businessman Ernst Oppert. Féron, who had
been rescued from Korea by the French invasion, hoped to return to the
peninsula to unearth the remains of the biological father of Daewongun.
He enlisted the financial support of Frederick Jenkins, who duped the State
Department into orchestrating a mission to Korea, an elaborate cover for
Féron’s scheme. On July 3, 1868, George Seward sent a dispatch to his
uncle, informing him “that the party with which Mr. Jenkins proceeded
to Corea had been engaged in an attempt to take from their tombs the
remains of one or more sovereigns of that country for the purpose, it
would seem, of holding them for ransom.”42 On July 27, 1868, William
H. Seward withdrew his instructions. His first two attempts to resolve the
General Sherman crisis yielded no progress. Four days later, Wells Williams
communicated the results of Febiger’s voyage to the Secretary of State,
informing him that the whole crew of the General Sherman had undoubtedly
perished, and that “the evidence goes to uphold the presumption that they
invoked their sad fate by some rash or violent acts towards the natives.”43
In the wake of his failed diplomatic expedition, George Seward called
a conference to discuss the Korean crisis with the U.S. Ministers to Japan
and China as well as the Commander of the Asian Fleet of the U.S. Navy.
It was agreed that simple friendly diplomacy would not be sufficient to
discover the fate of the General Sherman and negotiate a commercial treaty
with Korea. Seward communicated this opinion to his uncle on October
14, 1868, advising, “that a considerable show of force would probably
be needed.”44 The Consul-General remained upbeat about the prospect
of opening Korea, recalling how Commodore Perry’s mission to Japan
had shown “that these eastern peoples are not unalterably wedded to old
practices and institutions.”45 The Secretary of State received the report on
the 7th of December, and resolved to discuss his nephew’s assessments with
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. However, Andrew Johnson had lost
the presidential election to Ulysses S. Grant a month before, and both Welles
and Seward relinquished their posts before any such meeting took place.
The American Invasion of Korea
On December 27, 1868, Admiral Henry H. Bell filed a report proposing
dramatic military intervention in Korea. In his report, he advocated an
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occupation of Seoul, an undertaking that would require more than 2,000
amphibious soldiers as well as regular army reinforcements. He followed
Shufeldt’s advice and suggested using Port Hamilton as a launching point
for the operation. Finally, he warned against cooperating with colonial
powers such as Britain or France. This plan, he explained in a letter
to Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, “would awe not only Japan and the
Court of Peking into profound respect for American views and interests,
but would disclose to the world who are the masters of the Pacific.”46
In Washington, Ulysses S. Grant selected Hamilton Fish, a former
Congressman and Governor of New York, as Seward’s replacement as
Secretary of State. In a meeting with his successor, Seward suggested
moderating America’s demands in Korea to an agreement protecting
the victims of shipwrecks. Fish eventually complied with Seward’s
recommendation on April 20, 1870, forwarding these instructions on to
the new Minister to China, Frederick Low. Low was encouraged to seek
commercial advantages in Korea “should the opportunity seem favorable,”47
but reminded that “the President principally aims in this mission to secure
protection and good treatment to such seamen of the United States as may
unhappily be wrecked upon those shores.”48 Fish instructed Low to gather
as much information regarding Korea as possible before setting out. Finally,
Fish informed Low that he was to be accompanied by a naval fleet under
the command of Admiral John Rogers. However, he cautioned him to
“avoid a conflict by force unless it cannot be avoided without dishonor.”49
Evidently, the intelligence Low gathered on Korea did not inspire a
great degree of confidence regarding his mission. By November of 1870,
Low had grown pessimistic about his prospects. He reported to Fish on
November 22, “I am not sanguine of favorable results; at the same time the
object aimed at is worthy of trial.”50 He reiterated his doubts in a dispatch
written on board the flagship USS Colorado in the Harbor of Nagasaki on
May 13, 1871, predicting, “I apprehend that all the cunning and sophistry
which enter so largely into oriental character will be brought to bear to
defeat the object of our visit, and if that fails it is not unlikely that we may
be met with a display of force.”51 Captain McLane Tilton shared Low’s
pessimism, writing to his wife on June 4, “My impression at this moment
is, that the people will have no intercourse with us, and our journey will
be so much love’s labor lost.”52 He proceeds to express his misgivings
regarding the size of the American fleet, doubting the outfit’s prospects
“against a populous country containing 10,000,000 of [sic] savages!”53
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The Flag of the Commander in Chief of the Korean Forces, Felice
Beato, June 1871. (The J. Paul Getty Museum, 2007.26.199.46)
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On March 17, 1871, as per his instructions, Low notified the Zongli
Yamen of his upcoming excursion to Korea. China again maintained
Korea’s diplomatic autonomy. More importantly, they informed Korea of
the impending arrival of another American envoy. Daewongun resolved
to resist the westerners, heralding Korea as the final stronghold of the
Confucian order. A frustrated Pak Kyusu responded to China on April 14,
requesting that China persuade the United States to cancel Low’s mission.
Pak complained that the General Sherman incident had been resolved and
that an agreement protecting shipwrecked sailors would be frivolous. In
addition, he argued that Korean trade would not prove profitable for
Americans, citing Korea’s inability to satisfy the demands of their own
people. Korea’s policy of non-intercourse forbade Pak from sending a
similar message to the Americans. As a result, Low and Rodgers assumed
they had proclaimed their peaceful intentions, and set sail for Korea.
On May 30, Low met with three Korean officials of uncertain rank
on board the USS Colorado. He informed them that he would soon
send a surveying team up the Han River. He reiterated his peaceful
intentions, promising that no harm would come to the Koreans as long
as the American ships were not threatened. On May 31, three more
Korean officials, apparently of low rank, approached the American outfit,
giving implicit approval for Low’s explorations. However, the surveying
party drew fire as it reached the bend in the Han River at Sondolmok.
On June 2, Low fumed to Fish that the Korean attack was “unprovoked
and wanton, and without the slightest shadow of excuse.”54 He declared the
Koreans “semi-barbarous and hostile,”55 However, a Western newspaper in
China suggested that the attack was not as gratuitous as Low claimed. The
newspaper reported that the Americans had ignored various warning signs,
including a demonstration by 2,000 soldiers that “seemed intended to induce
the surveying party to retire.”56 George F. Seward criticized the actions of
the fleet, writing to Assistant Secretary of State Bancroft Davis, “I do not
know why the surveying should have been pushed forward so rapidly.”57
In his June 2 report to the Secretary of State, Low highlighted the
American dilemma, ruminating,
The question now is, what is the safe and prudent course to
pursue in view of this temporary check, which the Coreans will
undoubtedly construe into a defeat of the “barbarians,” but
which, according to the recognized rules of civilized warfare,
was a complete victory on the part of the naval forces.58
62 Ian Murray

Seward’s True Folly
This was to become the principal American dilemma with regards to the
Invasion of Korea. America had no interest in colonizing or occupying
Korea. Indeed, such a course of action would contravene the very
principles on which Americans conducted their diplomacy in East Asia.
However, the United States had maneuvered its way into a quagmire
wherein anything short of total victory would be tantamount to utter defeat.
Low opted to present the Koreans with a ten-day ultimatum, largely as
a ploy to delay the conflict until the currents of the Han River turned in
America’s favor. If the Koreans did not apologize for their aggression at
Sondolmok, they would be subjected to American retaliation. On June 4,
Pak Kyusu sent a letter to the American fleet, informing them that Korea
simply could not understand their intentions, and imploring the Americans
to understand Korean suspicion. During the ten-day interval, a curious
system of communication developed. Each night, Koreans affixed
messages to a pole erected in the mud flats near where the American fleet
was anchored. The Americans would collect these messages each morning.
However, none of the messages satisfied Low’s demands. In a last ditch
attempt to stave off the attack, the Koreans sent one last letter that was
carried to the Americans on board a ship waving a white flag. However, the
letter did not contain an apology, and Rodgers ordered his fleet to retaliate.
On June 15, Low summarized his expedition in a dispatch to the Secretary
of State, maintaining that he had made every effort to resolve the dispute
amicably, and resorted to violence only as a last resort. On September 20,
Fish notified Low that the State Department approved of his actions, and
that the American people celebrated his victory as a fitting retribution for the
destruction of the General Sherman. In his annual message to Congress, President
Ulysses S. Grant took credit for Seward’s initiative, revising history as follows:
Prompted by a desire to put an end to the barbarous
treatment of our shipwrecked sailors on the Korean
coast, I instructed our minister at Peking to endeavor
to conclude a convention with Korea for securing
the safety and humane treatment of such mariners.59
He asserted that the expedition had been “treacherously attacked at a
disadvantage,” and celebrated Rodgers’ triumph as having “punished the
criminals” and “vindicated the honor of the flag.”60 He gracefully tiptoed
around the fact that the mission had not fulfilled its stated objective,
concluding that the “the expedition returned, finding it impracticable
under the circumstances to conclude the desired convention.”61
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Unlike the United States, Korea actually accomplished its goals, provoking
an American withdrawal without being forced to abandon its isolationist
policies. Daewongun concluded that the American declarations of peaceful
intent were pretense, rhetorically asking the Chinese why the Americans,
if they meant no ill will, felt the need to furnish their expedition with over
1,000 soldiers. He presumed that the American expedition was nothing
more than “a crafty scheme to take advantage of our negligence, and get
into the interior.”62 A survey of the American diplomatic tradition in East
Asia and the diplomatic correspondence preceding the conflict disproves
this theory. As Gordon H. Chang emphasizes, “the Americans sincerely
believed they had come in peace and harbored no malice toward Korea…
they were in Korean waters only to raise the barbarous and inferior Koreans
to a higher standard of behavior in international relations.”63 America’s
Invasion of Korea was not disingenuous. It was simply a bad idea.
The Shufeldt Treaty and the Opening of Korea
Korea’s vindication of her policy of seclusion was short-lived. The
Japanese had already fixed their gaze upon the peninsula, fearing Russian
expansionism. Between 1869 and 1872, the Japanese launched four missions
attempting to establish diplomatic relations with Korea, but Daewongun
rebuffed them each time. In 1875, Koreans fired upon a small Japanese ship
in Korean waters. The Japanese destroyed four Korean forts in retaliation,
inflicting heavy casualties. In December 1875, General Kuroda and Count
Inoue arrived in Korea to negotiate a Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Like
George F. Seward in 1868 and Frederick Low in 1871, Inoue and Kuroda
had been instructed to follow the methods Commodore Perry had used
in Japan. This time, these tactics prevailed. Japan and Korea signed the
Treaty of Kianghwa on February 27, 1876, establishing diplomatic relations,
opening three Korean ports, securing extraterritorial rights for Japanese
nationals, and detaching Korea from Chinese suzerainty.
On October 29, 1878, Navy Secretary Richard W. Thompson authorized
Admiral Robert W. Shufeldt to open Korea for America. The initiative for
this expedition came almost entirely from Shufeldt himself. The Admiral
blamed Western behavior for the failure of 1871, and resolved to mollify
King Gojong throughout the proceedings. At first, Shufeldt attempted
to exploit the newly forged Japano-Korean intimacy, but Japan suspected
ulterior motives and impeded his efforts. Equally curious of Shufeldt’s
intentions was Li Hungchang, the Chinese official for Korean affairs, who
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invited Shufeldt to Tianjin. Li offered to use his authority to persuade
Korea to negotiate, evidently hoping to exploit the negotiations to offset
Japan’s recognition of Korean independence. Li enlisted Chinese officials
to transport the treaty to Korea on board a Chinese ship, despite the fact
that Shufeldt refused to insert a clause recognizing Korean subservience to
China. Shin Chen and Chin Hong-Chi of the Korean Royal Cabinet signed
the Shufeldt Treaty on behalf of King Gojong on May 22, 1882. Japanese
and American success in Korea inspired a great contest for Korea, with Great
Britain and Germany securing treaties with the Hermit Kingdom in 1883,
followed by Italy in 1884 and France in 1886.
			*
*
*
Throughout the middle decades of the 19th century, American diplomats
pursued consistent goals in the Far East: striving to earn most-favored-nation
status and protecting the lives and property of American citizens while
preserving the sovereign integrity of Asian nations. Every plenipotentiary
who crossed the Pacific to negotiate the opening of Asian commerce—Caleb
Cushing, Matthew C. Perry, Townshend Harris, George F. Seward, Frederick
Low, and Robert W. Shufeldt—carried with him the same American principles.
The differences between these missions, therefore, were not ideological.
They were strategic. For example, Perry and Low’s missions were necessarily
more threatening than Cushing’s, as Japan and Korea clung to traditional
policies of seclusion in a way that China did not. Furthermore, Japan had a
reputation for brutal treatment of shipwrecked American sailors and Korea
had set fire to the General Sherman, which was still presumed to have been a
legitimate commercial venture at the time of the Low expedition.
Low’s expedition, the 1871 American Invasion of Korea, mimicked
Commodore Perry’s 1853 mission to Japan both ideologically and strategically.
However, whereas Perry’s action reflected an accurate assessment of strategic
realities, Low’s action “was as much of a failure as most imitations are.”64 The
Invasion of Korea was an unwinnable war. Considering the spike in Korean
morale after the prior French Invasion, a diplomatic mission backed by a small
naval fleet was not sufficient to end Korea’s seclusion. Even if force was the
best option, then America would have had to utterly decimate Korea, perhaps
even occupy the peninsula, before Daewongun would have submitted to the
treason of international commerce. A mere five American warships could
never have sufficed. America’s commitment to anti-colonialism rendered this
solution untenable. In the greater context of American diplomacy in the
Far East, the American Invasion of Korea stands out not as an imperialistic
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anomaly or a moral atrocity. It distinguishes itself as a woeful miscalculation
and a sheer strategic nightmare.
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